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Supreme Court holds that considerations of public policy, as reflected
by Omnibus Transportation Employee Testing Act of 1991 and Department
of Transportation (DOT) implementing regulations, did not preclude
enforcement of arbitration award ordering employer to reinstate truck
driver who had twice tested positive for marijuana. Eastern Associated
Coal Corp v. United Mine Workers of America, 121 S. Ct. 462 (2000).
The arbitration provisions in Eastern Associated Coal Corporation's
collective-bargaining agreement (CBA) with the Union specify that Eastern
must prove in binding arbitration that it has "just cause" to discharge an
employee, or else the arbitrator will order the employee reinstated. James
Smith worked for Eastern as a truck driver subject to Department of
Transportation (DOT) regulations requiring random drug testing of workers
engaged in "safety-sensitive" tasks. After each of two occasions on which
Smith tested positive for marijuana, Eastern sought to discharge him. Each
time, the Union went to arbitration, and the arbitrator concluded that the
drug use did not amount to "just cause" and ordered Smith's reinstatement
on certain conditions.
On the second occasion, Eastern filed suit to vacate the arbitrator's
award. The federal district court ordered the award's enforcement, holding
that Smith's conditional reinstatement did not violate the strong regulation-
based public policy against drug use by workers who perform safety-
sensitive functions. The 4th Circuit affirmed.
The Court assumed that the CBA itself calls for Smith's reinstatement,
as the parties have granted the arbitrator authority to interpret the meaning
of their contract's language, including such words as "just cause," and
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Eastern did not claim that the arbitrator acted outside the scope of his
contractually delegated authority. Since the award is not distinguishable
from the contractual agreement, the Court had to decide whether a
contractual reinstatement requirement would fall within the legal exception
that makes unenforceable a CBA that is contrary to public policy. Any
such policy must be "explicit," "well defined," and "dominant," and it must
be "ascertained by reference to the laws and legal precedents, not from
general considerations of supposed public interests." The question is not
whether Smith's drug use itself violates public policy, but whether the
agreement to reinstate him does so.
A contractual agreement to reinstate Smith with specified conditions
does not run contrary to public policy. The public policy exception is
narrow and must satisfy the principles set forth in those cases. Moreover,
where two political branches have created a detailed regulatory regime in a
specific field, courts should approach with particular caution pleas to divine
further public policy in that area. Eastern asserted that a public policy
against reinstatement of workers who use drugs could be discerned from an
examination of the Omnibus Transportation Employee Testing Act of 1991
and DOT's implementing regulations.
However, these expressions of positive law embody not just policies
against drug use by employees in safety-sensitive transportation positions
and in favor of drug testing, but also include a Testing Act policy favoring
rehabilitation of employees who use drugs. The award here is not contrary
to these several policies, taken together, as it does not condone Smith's
conduct or ignore the risk to public safety that drug use by truck drivers
may pose, but punishes Smith by placing conditions on his reinstatement.
It violates no specific provision of any law or regulation, but is consistent
with DOT rules requiring completion of substance-abuse treatment before
returning to work and with the Act's driving license suspension
requirements and its rehabilitative concerns.
Moreover, the fact that Smith is a recidivist is not sufficient to tip the
balance in Eastern's favor. Eastern's argument that DOT's withdrawal of a
proposed "recidivist" rule leaves open the possibility that discharge is the
appropriate penalty for repeat offenders failed because DOT based the
withdrawal, not upon a determination that a more severe penalty was
needed, but upon a determination to leave in place other remedies. The
Court could not find in the Act, the regulations, or any other law or legal
precedent an explicit, well defined, dominant public policy to which the
arbitrator's decision runs contrary.
In a concurring opinion, Justices Scalia and Thomas joined in the
Court's judgment, but criticized the majority for agreeing with the principle
that "courts' authority to invoke the public policy exception is not limited
solely to instances where the arbitration award itself violates positive law."
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In the opinion of these two Justices, "it is hard to imagine how an
arbitration award could violate a public policy... without actually
conflicting with positive law. If such an award could ever exist, it would
surely be so rare that the benefit of preserving the courts' ability to deal
with it is far outweighed by the confusion and uncertainty, and hence the
obstructive litigation, that the Court's Delphic 'agree[ment] in principle'
will engender."
Supreme Court holds that and order compelling arbitration and
dismissing a party's underlying claims is a 'final decision with respect to
an arbitration" within meaning of Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), and thus
is immediately appealable. This abrogated Seacoast Motors of Salisbury,
Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 143 F.3d 626 (1st Cir. 1998), Altman Nursing, Inc.
v. Clay Capital Corp., 84 F.3d 769 (5th Cir. 1996), Napleton v. General
Motors Corp., 138 F.3d 1209 (7th Cir. 1998), Gammaro v. Thorp
Consumer Discount Co., 15 F.3d 93 (8th Cir. 1994), and McCarthy v.
Providential Corp., 122 F.3d 1242 (9th Cir. 1997). The Court also holds
that an arbitration agreement that does not mention arbitration costs and
fees is not per se unenforceable on theory that it fails to affirmatively
protect a party from potentially steep arbitration costs. Green Tree Fin.
Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph, 121 S. Ct. 513 (2000).
Randolph sued claiming violations of the Truth in Lending Act
(TILA) and Equal Credit Opportunity Act. The trial court granted Green
Tree's motion to compel arbitration, and dismissed all claims with
prejudice. The 11th Circuit held that the trial court's order to arbitrate was
an appealable "final order" and reversed the order to arbitrate. The US
Supreme Court held that the order was final and appealable, and that the
arbitration agreement was enforceable.
Randolph's mobile home financing agreement with Green Tree
contained an arbitration clause that was silent as to arbitration costs. When
Randolph sued, Green tree insisted that the matter be arbitrated.
A unanimous Court decided that when a trial court orders the parties
to arbitrate, and dismisses all the claims before it, the decision is a "final
order" under federal Arbitration Act Section 16(a)(3), and therefore is
appealable. There is no exception for "embedded" proceedings in which
there is both an arbitration request and claims for other relief. However, a
the Court split 5-4 in deciding that the arbitration agreement is enforceable
even though it says nothing about arbitration costs.
In the dissent, the issue on enforceability of the arbitration agreement
should be remanded for clarification of the facts as to the accessibility of
the arbitral forum to Randolph. Editor's Comment: In many circuit courts
there had built up a distinction between "embedded" proceedings and
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"independent" proceedings. In those circuits, an arbitration order in an
independent proceeding was final and appealable, but an arbitration order
in an embedded proceeding was not final and not appealable. That
distinction is now abolished, and all such orders are final. The 1st, 5th, 7th,
8th, and 9th Circuits now have to change their approach.
Editors Note: On remand, the trial court held, and the 11th Circuit
affirmed, that contractual provision to arbitrate TILA claims is enforceable
even if it precludes plaintiff from utilizing class action procedures in
vindicating statutory rights under TILA.
Supreme Court holds that states are not required by the Fourteenth
Amendment to make special accommodations for the disabled, so long as
their actions towards such individuals are rational. The Court also holds
that the legislative record of the ADA fails to show that Congress identified
a pattern of irrational state discrimination in employment against the
disabled. Thus, there was no support for an abrogation of the states'
Eleventh Amendment immunity from suits for money damages under Title I
of the ADA. Therefore, the Eleventh Amendment bars state employees'
federal court ADA suits.
Congress' § 5 enforcement authority under the Fourteenth
Amendment is appropriately exercised only in response to state
transgressions, and not constitutional violations by units of local
governments. In any event, the rights and remedies created by the ADA
against the states raise concerns as to congruence and proportionality,
supporting determination that Congress did not validly abrogate the states'
immunity. University of Alabama v. Garrett, 121 S. Ct. 955 (2001).
State employees sued the University of Alabama seeking money
damages under Title I (employment discrimination) of the Americans With
Disabilities Act (ADA). The Supreme Court ultimately upheld, by a 5-4
vote, the trial court's grant of summary judgment for the University.
Suits in federal court by state employees to recover money damages
by reason of the states' failure to comply with Title I of the ADA are barred
by the Eleventh Amendment. Congress may abrogate states' Eleventh
Amendment immunity when it both unequivocally intends to do so and acts
pursuant to a valid grant of constitutional authority. Only the second
requirement was at issue in this case. Congress cannot abrogate states'
immunity by using Article I powers (e.g., the commerce power), but can
use Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. To the extent Congress
reaches beyond the scope of the protections of Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, it must exhibit "congruence" and "proportionality" between
the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end.
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The Court had previously held that the states' treatment of disabled
individuals is subject only to minimum "rational basis" review. Thus, the
Fourteenth Amendment itself does not require states to make special
accommodations for the disabled. The legislative history of the ADA fails
to show that Congress identified a history and pattern of irrational
employment discrimination by the states. Although there were half a dozen
relevant examples in the record, these do not suggest a pattern of
unconstitutional discrimination on which Section 5 legislation must be
based.
The rights and remedies created by the ADA do not show the
necessary congruence and proportionality. For example, the ADA requires
employers to make their facilities readily accessible to disabled individuals
unless to do so would impose an undue hardship. That requirement far
exceeds what the constitution requires. By contrast, the Court upheld the
Voting Rights Act of 1965 because Congress had documented a marked
pattern of unconstitutional action by the states and had determined that
litigation was an ineffective remedy.
Supreme Court holds that held that only employment contracts of
transportation workers were exempted from the Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA), not all employment contracts as thought by the Ninth Circuit,
abrogating Craft v. Campbell Soup Co., 177 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 1998).
Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, No. 99-1379, 2001 WL 273205, 2001
U.S. Lexis 2459 (Mar. 21, 2001)
A provision in Adams's application for work at Circuit City required
all employment disputes to be settled by arbitration. After he was hired,
Adams filed a state-law employment discrimination action against Circuit
City, which then sued in federal court to enjoin the state-court action and to
compel arbitration pursuant to the FAA. The District Court entered the
requested order. The Ninth Circuit reversed, interpreting Section 1 of the
FAA - which excludes from that Act's coverage "contracts of employment
of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in
foreign or interstate commerce" - to exempt all employment contracts from
the FAA's reach. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Section 1
exemption is confined to transportation workers. Therefore, Adams's
agreement to arbitrate is covered by the FAA.
The FAA's coverage provision, Section 2, compels judicial
enforcement of arbitration agreements "in any.., contract evidencing a
transaction involving commerce." The "involving commerce" phrase
implements Congress' intent to exercise its commerce power to the full.
The statutory text forecloses the construction that Section 1 excludes
all employment contracts from the FAA. Unlike Section 2's "involving
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commerce" language, the Section 1 words "any other class of workers
engaged in... commerce" constitute a residual phrase, following, in the
same sentence, explicit reference to "seamen" and "railroad employees."
The residual clause should be read to give effect to the terms "seamen" and
"railroad employees," and should be controlled and defined by reference to
those terms.
The Court was not persuaded by the assertion that its Section 1
interpretation should be guided by the fact that, when Congress adopted the
FAA, the phrase "engaged in commerce" came close to expressing the
outer limits of its Commerce Clause power as then understood. This fact
alone does not provide any basis to adopi, "by judicial decision, rather than
amendatory legislation," an expansive construction of the FAA's exclusion
provision that goes beyond the meaning of the words Congress used.
As the Court's conclusion was directed by Section l's text, the rather
sparse legislative history of the exclusion provision was not assessed. The
Court brushed aside the argument that, under the Court's reading, the FAA
in effect pre-empts state employment laws restricting the use of arbitration
agreements.
Supreme Court holds that Washington statute providing for automatic
revocation, upon divorce, of any designation of spouse as beneficiary of
nonprobate asset was preempted, as it applied to ERISA benefit plans. The
state law "related to" ERISA plans, which directly conflicted with ERISA
requirement that plans be administered, and benefits be paid, in
accordance with plan documents. Therefore, ERISA preempts the state
probate statute. Egelhoffv. Egelhoff, No. 99-1529, 2001 WL 273198, 2001
U.S. Lexis 2458 (March, 21 2001).
Washington Revised Statute 11.07.010 provides that upon dissolution
of marriage a beneficiary designation in favor of a former spouse is
revoked. The United States Supreme Court reversed the Washington
Supreme Court's holding that ERISA didn't preempt the statute, and that
the statute applied to ERISA plans. ERISA's preemption section provides
that ERISA "shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may
now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan" covered by ERISA.
The Court has held that a state law "relates to" an ERISA plan "if it has
connection with or reference to such a plan."
Based on that test, the court held that the Washington probate statute
has an impermissible connection with ERISA plans. More specifically, the
court held that the statute fails the "connection with" prong of the test
because 1) the statute "governs the payment of benefits, a central matter of
plan administration;" and 2) the statute "interferes with nationally uniform
plan administration."
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Court holds that an arbitration clause in appellee Laboratory
Corporation of America's ERISA-governed health benefits plan is
enforceable. Court also holds that appellant should have received leave to
amend his complaint to state a claim against the administrator of the plan
for breach of fiduciary duty in failing adequately to notify Chappel of the
existence and terms of the arbitration clause. Chappel v. Laboratory
Corporation of America, 232 F.3d 719 (9th Cir. 2000).
An ERISA fiduciary has a duty to "discharge its duties with respect to
a plan solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries." This duty
applies when an ERISA fiduciary writes and implements an arbitration
clause. The court noted that although existing ERISA regulations do not
specifically address arbitration, they provide guidance for a fiduciary
seeking to create reasonable" arbitration procedures. The court concluded
stating that a fiduciary should also "give written notice of steps to be taken
to obtain external review through mandatory arbitration when it denies an
internal appeal."
Court holds that the failure of officers to form a "blue wall of
silence," after claimant was discovered in a state vehicle, was not violation
of claimant's equal protection rights. The Court also holds that the claim
that the investigation and subsequent imposition of punishment was
retaliatory was precluded by determination that same result would have
been reached if claimant had not cooperated with internal affairs
investigation. Finally, the court holds that the officers did not engage in
any actionable harassment. Diesel v. Town of Lewisboro, 232 F.3d 92 (2d
Cir. 2000).
Diesel sued under 42 USC Section 1983, claiming he was subjected to
"selective enforcement" of the law in violation of his federal equal
protection rights. The court observed that selective enforcement claims
present "a 'murky comer' of equal protection law in which there are
surprisingly few cases." In order to prevail on such a claim, an employee
must show that compared with others similarly situated, he was selectively
treated and such selective treatment was based on impermissible
considerations such as race, religion, intent to inhibit or punish the exercise
of constitutional rights, or malicious or bad faith intent to injure.
Diesel basically claimed that he was entitled to the benefits of the
"blue wall of silence," behind which police officers allegedly cover up
occasional misconduct on the part of other officers. The court held that "a
selective enforcement claim under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment cannot rest on the allegation that police officers
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refused to close their eyes to another officer's serious misconduct in
accordance with the tradition of the 'blue wall of silence.'
Court holds that the minimum contacts test for personal jurisdiction
inapposite under ERISA Section 1132(e)(2) and that the California statute
wasn't preempted by ERISA. Medical Mutual of Ohio v. deSoto, 234 F.3d
298 (6th Cir. 2000).
DeSoto was a participant in a group insurance plan that was a "welfare
benefit plan" governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA). The plan sued deSoto for reimbursement after deSoto settled a
suit against a hospital for damages arising from inadequate care. Two
primary issues on appeal were 1) whether the trial court had personal
jurisdiction over deSoto, and 2) whether California Civil Code section
3333.1 was preempted by ERISA.
Section 1132(e)(2) of ERISA confers "nationwide" personal
jurisdiction. Normally, when determining the existence of personal
jurisdiction, the "minimum contacts" test set out by International Shoe Co.
v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) applies. The personal jurisdiction
requirement restricts judicial power as a matter of individual liberty - an
individual's due process right not to be subject to extra-territorial
jurisdiction unless he has a sufficient relationship with the state asserting
jurisdiction. When a federal court sitting pursuant to federal question
jurisdiction exercises personal jurisdiction over a United States citizen
based on a congressionally authorized nationwide service of process
provision, that individual liberty interest is not threatened. In such a case, a
federal court exercises jurisdiction for the territory of the United States, and
the individual liberty concern is whether the individual has sufficient
minimum contacts with the United States. Thus, a "national contacts"
analysis is applicable and under that test, assertion of personal jurisdiction
over deSoto was proper.
California Civil Code § 3333.1 allows a health care provider being
sued for professional negligence to introduce evidence that the plaintiff
obtained collateral benefits from its insurance company. The Code
prohibits the source of those collateral benefits, the insurance company,
from recovering the benefits it provided the plaintiff or subrogating the
plaintiff's right to recover. The court held that § 3333.1 is not preempted
by ERISA basing its decision on its finding that the benefit plan was an
insured plan, and not a self-funded plan.
Court holds that an employer cannot unilaterally implement policy
after declaring impasse on that issue, inasmuch as parties had reached
only piecemeal, not overall, impasse during the collective bargaining
UPDATES
process. Duffy Tool & Stamping L.L.C. v. NLRB, 233 F.3d 995 (7th Cir.
2000).
The issue on appeal was whether an employer could make unilateral
changes in the terms and conditions of its workers' employment when the
parties reach a deadlock on an issue during negotiation. Here, a "no fault"
attendance policy proposed by the employer was less lenient than the one
that presently existed was at issue. Because the union opposed the policy
during negotiations on a new collective bargaining agreement, the
employer declared an impasse and then unilaterally implemented the new
policy.
The union argued that unilateral implementation of the new policy
was unlawful, since the parties had not yet reached an overall impasse in
the negotiations. Otherwise, by deadlocking on a particular issue an
employer is free to implement his proposal regarding that issue.
The court noted further that allowing employers to declare impasse on
a single issue would make eventual overall agreement less likely by
removing issues from the bargaining agenda. The court reasoned that both
parties would be more satisfied when there are a number of issues that have
been resolved or compromised by both parties. In addition, the court
observed that "there is really no such animal as a deadlock on a single issue
in a multifaceted negotiation" anyway. Based on the considerations above,
as well as the overall policy considerations underlying federal labor law,
the court concluded that the NLRB was on "sound ground" in insisting that
the employer bargain until the parties are deadlocked in the negotiations as
a whole.
Court affirms jury verdict of same-race racial harassment under Title
VII. Ross v. Douglas County, 234 F.3d 391 (8th Cir. 2000).
Ross sued his former employer alleging, among other things, hostile
environment race discrimination in violation of Title VII. The trial court
granted judgment in favor of Ross after a jury verdict in his favor; the
Eighth Circuit affirmed.
Ross was a black male. The bulk of the allegedly hostile conduct at
issue came from Ross's supervisor. The employer argued that, since the
supervisor was a black male, he could not have had the racial animus
required to support a hostile environment claim. The court rejected that
argument on the basis of the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 US 75 (1998).
In Oncale, a male was subjected to humiliating sex-related conduct by
other males at work. The Supreme Court held that "nothing in Title VII
necessarily bars a claim of discrimination.., merely because the plaintiff
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and the defendant... are of the same sex." The court concluded that
"[g]iven the Oncale decision, we have no doubt that, as a matter of law, a
black male could discriminate against another black male 'because of such
individual's race."'
Court holds that a female employee with Chronic Fatigue Syndrome
presented evidence of pretext sufficient to create a question of fact for the
jury with respect to her failure-to-promote claim. Therefore, the
employer's reason for promoting a male could be a pretext. Durley v
APAC, Inc, 236 F.3d 651 (1 1th Cir. 2000).
Durley sued claiming sex discrimination, violation of the Americans
With Disabilities Act (ADA), retaliation for filing an EEOC charge, and
intentional infliction of emotional distress. The trial court granted
summary judgment for the employer; the 11th Circuit reversed on the sex
discrimination claim, and affirmed on all other claims.
After working for the employer for about ten years, Durley, a female
who had served nine years as assistant purchasing agent, applied to be
promoted to purchasing agent. The employer closed one of its workshops,
consolidated two positions, and appointed a male instead of Durley.
Durley filed an EEOC charge. At EEOC's request, the employer prepared
a job description for the new position. The job description emphasized
warehouse and fabrication skills possessed by the male appointee rather
than the administrative duties that were the main function of the job
performed by the person who previously held the job.
The court reversed the summary judgment as to the sex discrimination
claim. There was evidence that the employer's stated reason for selecting
the male were pretextual. The stated reason was that the employer
consolidated the positions of purchasing agent and warehouse foreman, and
appointed the male because he was more qualified. There was evidence
that Durley was qualified, that the employer's "post-hoc formulation of a
job description... emphasized [the male's] warehouse and fabrication
skills," that the male lacked administrative or purchasing experience, that
Durley helped train the male appointee, and that the prior job-holder's list
of duties for a consolidated position included fabrication and simple
welding as being only 1 percent of the duties. All of her other claims were
rejected by the court.
Court holds that an employee's inability to engage in sexual
intercourse more than twice per month as result of back injury did not
substantially limit major life activities of sexual reproduction or engaging
in sexual relations, for purposes of ADA. Even if he had been able to have
intercourse 20 times per month prior to accident, absent any evidence as to
UPDATES
condition, manner or duration under which he could reproduce as
compared to average person in general population, his claims could not be
sustained.
Court also addresses the issue of working as a major life activity,
finding an individual's impairment "substantially limits" major life activity
of working if individual is significantly restricted in ability to perform class
of jobs or broad range of jobs in various classes. Contreras v. Suncast,
237 F.3d 756 (7th Cir. 2001).
Contreras sued his former employer alleging, among other things,
failure to reasonably accommodate in violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA). The trial court granted summary judgment in
favor of the employer; the 7th Circuit affirmed. Contreras contended that
he was substantially limited in the major life activities of working and
"reproduction/engaging in sexual relations."
With respect to the major life activity of working, Contreras claimed
that he was unable to lift in excess of 45 pounds for a long period of time,
unable to engage in strenuous work, and unable to drive a forklift for more
than four hours a day. The court concluded that these limitations were not
sufficient to constitute the required "substantial limitation" on Contreras's
ability to work. The court noted that the 4th, 5th, and 8th Circuits, when
faced with similar sets of facts, have found those limitations do not qualify
as a substantial limitation on working.
With respect to the major life activity of "sexual reproduction and
engaging in sexual relations," Contreras asserted that he was only able to
have intercourse twice per month. He claimed that, prior to his purported
disability, he had been able to engage in that activity twenty times per
month (a claim which the court noted was "unsupported").
The United States Supreme Court acknowledged that sexual
reproduction is a major life activity in Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 US 624
(1998). The court noted that "we recognize it may be argued that the
Supreme Court may have implied that engaging in sexual relations is a
major life activity." In Bragdon, the court concluded that an HIV infected
woman was substantially limited in her ability to reproduce. The Supreme
Court focused on the fact that an infected woman who attempts to
reproduce imposes a significant risk to any male she has intercourse with
(as well as her child).
The court distinguished this case from Bragdon. In contrast to
Bragdon, Contreras had not shown any significant impact on his ability to
reproduce. The court declined to decide whether engaging in sexual
relations is a major life activity, but concluded that even if it were,
Contreras had provided insufficient proof of a substantial limitation.
2001]
752 U. PA. JOURNAL OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW [Vol. 3:3
Court holds that reports about police misconduct prepared while
police officer worked as civilian employee for professional standards
department were not speech entitled to First Amendment protection.
Gonzalez v. City of Chicago, 239 F.3d 939 (7th Cir. 2001).
Gonzalez worked for a police department investigating public
complaints against officers. As the result of one of his reports, an officer
was discharged. After the officer's discharge, and the subsequent issuance
of additional reports regarding other officers, Gonzalez became the object
of a considerable amount of hostility. After eventually being discharged,
he sued the police department (and others) alleging he had suffered
retaliation in violation of his free speech rights under the 1st Amendment.
Claims by public employees asserting violations of 1st Amendment
free speech rights are analyzed under a two-step test. First, it must be
determined whether the employee spoke "as a private citizen upon matters
of public concern." If so, the interests of the employee (as a citizen in
commenting upon matters of public concern) must be balanced against the
interests of the state (as an employer in promoting the efficiency of the
public services it performs through its employees).
In Gonzalez's case, the issue centered on the first step of this test. The
court framed the primary issue on appeal as "whether a public employee
receives 1st Amendment protection for producing writings that may
address matters of public concern, but are also a routine requirement of the
job." All of the speech at issue was mandated in Gonzalez's capacity as an
investigator. Even though the content of the reports was a matter of public
concern, generation of the reports themselves was a necessary part of his
job. The few courts that have addressed such circumstances have held that
the speech at issue was not protected under the 1st Amendment. The court
agreed with those holdings. The court thus stopped short of establishing a
per se rule exempting statements made in the course of official duties from
1st Amendment protection.
Court holds that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether
county's articulated nondiscriminatory reason for not hiring white
applicant for one of training instructor positions during reorganization
was pretextual. The court also holds that an issue of fact existed as to
whether county acted pursuant to its affirmative action plans in not hiring
white applicant. The affirmative action plan was direct evidence of
discrimination. Bass v. Board of County Comm'rs, No. 99-10579, 2001
WL 169746, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 2442 (1lth Cir. Feb, 21, 2001).
Bass, a "non-Hispanic white" employee, sued the employer claiming
(among other things) race discrimination in violation of Title VII. He
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claimed that the employer's failure to hire him for an alternative position,
after his position was eliminated via a reduction-in-force, was
impermissibly race based. The employer had in place an affirmative action
plan. Normally, if an employer were found to have acted pursuant to an
affirmative action plan, the next question would be whether the plan was
valid under Title VII.
In Bass' case, though, the employer distanced itself from the
affirmative action plan. It was Bass who relied on the plan as direct
evidence of discrimination. The court held that in this situation, "the
affirmative action plan constitutes direct evidence of discrimination if there
is sufficient circumstantial evidence to permit a jury reasonably to conclude
that the employer was acting pursuant to its plan in taking the employment
action in question." The court noted that "a defendant who in fact acts
pursuant to an affirmative action plan cannot avoid judicial review of the
plan by disavowing reliance upon it, where there is evidence that the plan
played a part in the employment decision."
Throughout the trial, the employer repeatedly denied that it had relied
upon the plan. With respect to those denials, the court noted further that
"in the event that the jury disbelieves the County's denials... the County
is not entitled to retrench and argue that its affirmative action plans are
valid and constitute a defense to race discrimination claims."
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